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A Tale of One City: The Devo Manc Deal and its Implications for English Devolution 
DANIEL KENEALY 
Abstract 
On 2 November 2014 George Osborne stood in the impressive great council chamber of 
Manchester town hall. Flanked by the ten leaders of Greater Manchester’s local authorities 
Osborne announced a devolution deal for the city-region. Greater Manchester would receive 
a significant package of powers over transport, housing, planning, skills, business support, and 
welfare in exchange for creating new governance structures including a directly elected Mayor 
for the city-region. This article explores the background to the Devo Manc deal, arguing that 
it is the product of both a long history of local government collaboration in Greater 
Manchester, and George Osborne’s desire for a sweeping restructure of English governance. 
It traces how the key decisions were taken quickly and by a small number of key officials. The 
article also identifies some flaws in Devo Manc and considers whether it is an appropriate 
model for other city-regions in the UK. 
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Introduction 
In the space of a few months during 2014-2015 George Osborne, and the leaders of the ten 
local authorities (listed in table 2) that together form the Greater Manchester Combined 
Authority (GMCA), reached a set of agreements that, once implemented, have the potential 
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to be the most significant development in the way that the UK is governed since the 
devolution settlements for Scotland and Wales. This article explores the background of Devo 
Manc, sets out its details, and raises questions about the democratic legitimacy of the process 
and how it will work in practice. It also places the deal in the broader context of questions 
about the governance of England, questions that have become especially prominent in the 
aftermath of Scotland’s 2014 independence referendum. Research for this article was 
conducted between December 2014 and August 2015 as part of an ESRC-funded project on 
constitutional change in the UK. Conducted with colleagues at the University of Edinburgh the 
research involved a set of elite interviews with North West politicians, local government 
officials, civil servants in the UK Treasury and Cabinet Office, as well as a survey of public 
attitudes across the UK.1 
 
What is Devo Manc? 
Before tracing the development of Devo Manc it is important to understand precisely what it 
entails. On 2 November 2014 George Osborne and the ten leaders of the GMCA signed a 
document committing to devolve powers from Whitehall to the city-region.2 Some of these 
powers will be exercised directly by the GMCA, which has been in place since 2011 and was 
the first combined authority established in England. The GMCA brings together the ten leaders 
of the local authorities in the city-region and was a formalisation of previous, less 
institutionalised forms of collaboration. Each GMCA member holds a cross city-region 
portfolio responsibility (e.g. transport, crime and policing, employment and skills, 
internationalisation and marketing, etc.). Other powers will be transferred to a new, directly 
elected Mayor of Greater Manchester (GM) – that is the area covered by the ten authorities 
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comprising the GMCA. The creation of a Mayor was a precondition, set down by Osborne, for 
the transfer of the powers. 
 
The GMCA will take on powers in the areas of business support and growth, apprenticeships 
and further education, and welfare. Several elements of the UK government’s Business 
Growth Service – targeted at businesses based in England with fewer than 250 employees and 
less than £40 million in turnover – have been or are to be devolved, involving the transfer of 
some budget lines from Whitehall’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills  (BIS) to 
the GMCA. The GMCA will thus be able to tailor the provision of business support including 
mentoring business leaders, consultancy support, training, access to finance, and advice on 
increasing export sales.  
 
More substantial are a set of powers aimed at helping boost employment in the city-region. 
The Apprenticeship Grant for Employers – introduced by the UK’s coalition government in 
2011 – is now controlled by the GMCA as opposed to BIS in Whitehall. The agreement also 
gives the GMCA broader powers to shape further education provision, offering financial 
incentives to education providers to develop the skills most in demand by local employers.  
 
The GMCA will also be able to build on previous successes. The ‘Working Well’ pilot scheme – 
launched in May 2014 and aimed at helping those with illness or disability who have been 
unable to secure sustainable employment through the Work Programme – is to be extended, 
with Whitehall funding linked to job outcomes. Targeted at those on Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) who have been on the UK government’s welfare-to-work scheme for two 
years, ‘Working Well’ provides individually tailored packages of support for a further two 
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years, with up to a year of in-work support to increase the chance that employment, if 
secured, is retained. Although still in its infancy, ‘Working Well’ has hit its initial targets. 
However, the very small numbers of individuals it has managed to support into employment 
raises questions about whether the Work Programme is correctly identifying individuals who 
are capable of so-called ‘work related activity’.  
 
Also in the area of welfare, the GMCA will have the opportunity to jointly commission, along 
with the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), the next phase of the Work Programme. 
Avanta, G4S, and Seetec currently hold the contract to deliver the Work Programme in 
contract package area 7, which covers the GMCA’s territory as well as Warrington, Cheshire, 
and other parts of the North West of England. Those contracts are not due for renewal until 
2017 and it remains unclear how much scope the GMCA will have to influence the actual  
workings of the Work Programme, some of elements of which – particularly its conditionality 
and sanctioning – have come in for considerable criticism. This new power is far short of the 
move to devolve the Work Programme to the Scottish Parliament, one of the outcomes of the 
2014 Smith Commission in the aftermath of Scotland’s independence referendum.  
 
The new GM Mayor will take on responsibilities in four broad areas: transport, planning, 
housing, and policing. In transport the Mayor will receive, from Whitehall, a consolidated 
multi-year budget as well as responsibility for franchised bus services, railways stations, and 
smart ticketing. GM’s political leaders  are quick to point out that transport is a vital service 
underpinning much of what the city-region wants to do, from economic growth to higher 
employment (Interview, GMCA Member 1). They eye, with envy, the multi-year transport 
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budgets that enable the Mayor of London to engage in longer-term planning and the delivery 
of projects such as Crossrail. 
 
The Mayor’s most notable power in the area of planning is the ability to create a framework 
for managing spatial planning across the city-region. Alongside that, a Housing Investment 
Fund of £300 million will be devolved. The fund may be ‘loaned out and repaid two and a half 
times’ over the next decade, creating a total pot of around £1.5 billion, and helping to support 
the construction of 10-15,000 new houses.3 The Mayor will also take control of any money 
flowing back to the GMCA through the revised ‘Earn Back’ arrangement, which has been 
considerably simplified by Devo Manc, creating greater certainty about the flow of funding.4 
Policing powers, already residing in a Greater Manchester Police and Crime Commissioner 
(PCC), will simply be transferred to the Mayor, with the post of PCC ceasing to exist. 
 
The introduction of a directly elected Mayor is the biggest governance change brought in by 
Devo Manc. The Mayor will become the eleventh member of the GMCA and will permanently 
chair that body following their election in May 2017. The ten council leaders will continue to 
sit on the GMCA, each with a specific portfolio responsibility, supporting and advis ing the 
Mayor. The GMCA will have the power to reject the Mayor’s strategies and amend the Mayor’s 
spending plans if two-thirds of the members agree. On more general public service issues 
voting on the GMCA will be by majority, with each of the eleven members holding one vote. 
The current scrutiny arrangements for the GMCA, consisting of a pool of thirty non-executive 
councillors from across the ten constituent local authorities, will continue. 
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Nothing in Devo Manc gives the Mayor, or the GMCA, control over any new fiscal levers. For 
the most part what is being devolved are policy responsibilities and (ever shrinking) budgets 
to go with them. Even on the expenditure side the powers on offer represent about £1.5 
billion out of total GM public expenditure of £22 billion. In October 2015 Osborne announced 
a radical shake-up of the way local government was to be financed in England. Within a decade 
the core grant from Whitehall will be phased out, replaced by the retention of locally raised 
business rates by each local authority. That announcement, building on a March 2015 decision 
to allow GM to retain all additional business rate growth, represents a significant move 
towards fiscal devolution with local authorities empowered to vary the rates to suit local 
interests and circumstances.5 
 
Devo Manc was supplemented, in February 2015, by a deal to devolve GM’s £6 billion health 
and social care budget, a large part of which was already controlled by GM in one way or 
another. The original 2014 plan invited the GMCA and the city-region’s Clinical Commissioning 
Groups to develop a plan for the integration of health and social care (the ten local authorities 
had already taken steps in that direction individually). The February 2015 announcement went 
further. A new structure is to be established in the city-region, bringing together the ten local 
authorities, twelve Clinical Commissioning Groups, local NHS England management, 
regulators, the Greater Manchester Council for Voluntary Organisations, and HealthWatch 
(the local consumer champion for health care). 6  GM confronts a complex set of health 
problems and local health researchers and campaigners have expressed concern over local 
control, and the possibility of further outsourcing of services. But the potential of the deal is 
a more tightly integrated health and social care system in the region, with fewer beds blocked, 
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greater efficiencies, and a redistribution of some funding from hospitals to social care budgets 
that are creaking under the weight of Whitehall cuts. 
 
A final set of additional powers, announced in July 2015, committed to establishing a GM Land 
Commission, to transferring of the powers of the GM Fire Service to the new Mayor, to 
allowing the new Mayor to create Mayoral Development Corporations, and for the GMCA to 
take on decision-making powers about how to allocate EU structural funds across the city-
region. Considered as a whole Devo Manc is geared towards improving the economic 
performance of the region but also improving the delivery of public services. The two things 
are tightly linked in the minds of GM’s leaders. One GMCA leader put it quite clearly, ‘the 
strategy is to link local economic development to public service reform … Growth happens but 
it’s not linked to public sector reform. If you take decisions locally you can make efficiencies 
and you can get synergies’ (Interview, GMCA Member 1). 
 
How did Devo Manc happen? 
It is hardly surprising that GM is in the vanguard of city-region devolution. The ten local 
authorities have established a long track record of cooperation across the conurbation, a track 
record not replicated to the same extent anywhere else. Following Margaret Thatcher’s 
abolition of what her government labelled ‘wasteful and unnecessary’ Metropolitan Counties 
in her 1986 local government reforms7 – ostensibly designed to weaken local government and 
fragment responsibility for public service delivery – GM’s authorities took immediate efforts 
to preserve their cooperation even in the absence of a formal layer of government. That 
decision proved critical, for it set in motion a process of creating softer, less formally 
institutionalised spaces in which GM’s leaders could do business, coordinate their public 
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service provision, and attain economies of scale. It was driven by recognition that the lines on 
maps separating one local authority from another often bore little, if any, resemblance to 
meaningful functional boundaries. 
 
In the nearly thirty years since, a succession of institutions – as well as informal mechanisms 
of cooperation and coordination – have sprung up in GM.8 1986 can thus be seen as a critical 
juncture, in which a series of seemingly small decisions created certain path dependencies 
that shaped the way that GM came to be governed. The starting point was the Association of 
Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA), which functioned as the overarching vehicle for 
intergovernmental cooperation and service delivery in the late 1980s and 1990s. Slowly, GM 
witnessed a shift from ad-hoc developments to a conscious effort to rebuild and restore 
metropolitan governance.9 In 2009, Gordon Brown’s government announced that GM was to 
be given pilot statutory city-region status and the coalition government moved to formally 
establish the GMCA in 2011, representing the solidification of formerly softer structures.  
 
GM’s political leaders are proud of this legacy. They see it as vital to their recent successes: 
‘Part of this is ancient history, going back to the abolition of the Greater Manchester Council, 
and we’ve seen a 25 year track record of working together’ (Interview, GMCA Member 2). 
Across the M62 in Merseyside both politicians and local government officials recognise that 
GM’s historical track record of collaboration has put Merseyside’s efforts to shame (Interview, 
senior official, Liverpool City Council). ‘The main difference is that in Merseyside you have six 
Labour councils all fighting each other’ (Interview, Member of Knowsley Council). 
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Since at least the mid-1990s, GM’s leaders have been pressing hard for Whitehall to transfer 
powers to them. Two individuals – Richard Leese and Howard Bernstein – have proven crucial 
to developing both the capacity for GM to work collaboratively and, more specifically, the 
narrative on which Devo Manc has come to focus. Leese has been leader of Manchester City 
Council since 1996, Bernstein its chief executive since 1998. When they speak of devolution it 
is very much in terms of boosting the GM economy and closing the deficit of roughly £5 billion 
between what the city-region generates in tax revenues and what it receives in public 
expenditure. In part they envision doing this through the new economic powers contained in 
the devolution deal. But GM’s leaders also look forward to a future of fiscal devolution to the 
city-region. In all of this, the rhetoric of municipal socialism that characterised the drive for 
greater local autonomy in the 1980s has gone, replaced by a focus on the entrepreneurial city 
making its contribution to Gross Value Added.10 
 
Whilst the demand for more powers was there for years, there was a gap on the supply side. 
New Labour, in office from 1997 to 2010 were initially pre-occupied with their plans for 
regional assemblies, which came crashing down in the aftermath of the North East’s 2004 
referendum. Leese – one of Labour’s most senior elected officials at the local level – backed 
his party’s policy in the early 2000s but, after it stalled, returned to the idea of city-region 
governance. Leese and Bernstein had been on the cusp of signing a deal with Gordon Brown’s 
government but that deal failed to make it over the line before May 2010. The coalition 
government then moved quickly with ‘real engagement from the Treasury and the Chancellor 
… It’s really important to note that these things can only happen with the Treasury’s blessing’  
(Interview, GMCA Leader 2). But Leese and Bernstein were far from content with simply 
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creating the GMCA. They wanted to go beyond formalised cooperation within statutory 
structures, and start to take control of new powers from Whitehall. 
 
Developments in Whitehall, and especially in the Treasury, were of vital importance in the 
lead up to the summer of 2014. George Osborne had been won over to the idea of devolving 
powers to cities and city-regions. The policy landscape began, in 2013 and 2014, to become 
cluttered with weighty reports calling for the devolution of powers to cities and city-regions.11 
Of particular importance was the City Growth Commission. Established by the RSA it was 
chaired by the influential economist, and former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management, Jim O’Neill, himself from Manchester. By early 2014 O’Neill’s commission was 
speaking a similar language to that of Leese and Bernstein, the language of cities as drivers of 
economic growth, innovation, and productivity. In the aftermath of the financial crisis and 
subsequent recession, with a need to boost growth to help combat the deficit, and a longer 
running challenge to rebalance the UK economy away from London and the South East, such 
thinking was music to Osborne’s ears.  
 
The Chancellor, who has a dual role as the UK government’s chief political strategist, was also 
drawn in by the possibility of wrong-footing Labour by making a decisive move on English 
devolution where they had failed, despite many ideas and schemes.12 In June 2014, shortly 
after his party had suffered heavy losses in the 2014 European elections, Osborne delivered 
his ‘Northern Powerhouse’ speech in which he committed to connecting the key cities of the 
North of England – Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, Hull, and Leeds – through investment in 
better rail and road links.13 The ‘Northern Powerhouse’ is the bigger picture narrative that UK 
government ministers have attempted to situate Devo Manc within. 
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Through the summer of 2014, Devo Manc became the priority for the Treasury. It was the 
Treasury who contacted GM, seeking ways to turn the ‘Northern Powerhouse’ into concrete 
developments. Osborne tasked two Treasury officials – John Kingman, the Second Permanent 
Secretary, and David Silk, the Deputy Director responsible for housing, planning and cities – 
to work with Bernstein and Leese to construct a package of powers to be devolved. At the GM 
end Mike Emmerich – chief executive of the think tank New Economy, a former Treasury and 
Downing Street official, and a long-standing advocate of city devolution – was pivotal. Working 
closely with New Economy allowed Bernstein and his officials to work more quickly, producing 
documents that inspired confidence in the Treasury that GM could deliver (Interview, senior 
civil servant, HM Treasury). 
 
Osborne played an active role in ensuring that Devo Manc was supported across various 
Whitehall departments. His role was especially important because various Whitehall 
departments – especially the Department of Transport and BIS – had to be cajoled into 
relinquishing policy responsibilities, and the budgets to go with them. The Treasury, especially 
one headed by a politically active Chancellor, is a powerful enough department within 
Whitehall to bring other departments into line behind a given policy agenda. The Treasury 
initially worked on Devo Manc largely in secret, using their in-house spending teams and 
presenting the outcome as a fait accompli to other Whitehall departments. If a Cabinet 
minister objected, the Chancellor would deal with them personally, clearing any roadblocks. 
Otherwise, the Chancellor largely left the politics to his special adviser, Neil O’Brien (Interview, 
senior civil servant, HM Treasury; Interview, senior civil servant, Cabinet Office). 
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The major sticking point, once Osborne had brought Whitehall on board, was over the directly 
elected Mayor. Put simply, GM’s leaders did not want one but Osborne insisted. It has been 
somewhat fudged given that, as discussed above, the Mayor could end up being a largely 
glorified ‘chair’ of the GMCA with little institutional  power base. But Osborne’s insistence on 
a Mayor brings us back to the politics of it all. ‘Osborne has identified the prospect of a Boris 
[Johnson] for the North’ (Interview, Greater Manchester Police and Crime Commissioner). 
 
Devo Manc was thus the result of a double coincide of interests. A long-standing interest 
amongst GM leaders to win back powers for their city-region, coupled with a track record of 
successful cooperation across a large conurbation, was met by a set of political and economic 
interests held by a bold and powerful Chancellor. 
 
The bigger picture 
Whilst Devo Manc feeds into the Chancellor’s ‘Northern Powerhouse’ it must also be 
considered in the broader context of reforming the governance of England. Much of the focus 
has been on the attempt to introduce English Votes for English Laws (EVEL) in the House of 
Commons. EVEL has become, for some, a sort of panacea for the question of the governance 
of England. The survey conducted as part of the project on which research for this article is 
derived found that when asked to select one single change to the way that England is 
governed, people do tend to support EVEL. Other surveys have uncovered similar results.14 
But when we asked separately about EVEL, regionalism, and city-regions, it becomes clear that 
all have significant levels of support. There is no reason to see EVEL and city-regions as 
mutually exclusive. Indeed they are attempts to tackle very different questions .  
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There are, it seems, two facets to ‘the English Question’. The first is about England as a single 
unit being properly represented in the UK’s governing arrangements . For that, EVEL may well 
be the answer. The second question, just as important, is about decentralisation and, based 
on our survey findings, voters are open to various possibilities  (table 1). 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
But is Devo Manc a model for decentralisation within England? Other parts of England are 
seeking similar deals and, as of December 2015, five deals had been announced (Sheffield city 
region, Tees Valley, North East, Liverpool city region, West Midlands). Commonalities across 
these deals include transitioning to a directly-elected Mayor, a governance model that sees 
local authority leaders assuming new and additional portfolio responsibilities as part of the 
Mayor’s cabinet, and a focus on additional investment funds, adult skills provision, transport, 
housing, planning, and business development. However, no two deals are identical reflecting 
the specific politics of the areas and none of the five deals signed since Devo Manc are as 
extensive (e.g. Sheffield’s Mayor will not assume the PCC and fire functions, there is no 
mention of devolving health and social care, and the Sheffield City Region will have a more 
limited role in the Work Programme compared to the GMCA). Numerous other bids from local 
authorities for more powers are currently under consideration by the Treasury but, at the time 
of writing, the outcomes have not been announced. 
 
What can be said is that Devo Manc lit a fire under other combined authorities and larger 
metropolitan councils. Seeing what GM was able to accomplish has seemingly made other 
local authorities want to capture similar powers. There is already evidence of a domino effect. 
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The basic framework for such deals is now quite well understood. The Treasury want to see 
evidence of an ability by local authorities to work together to deliver growth and more 
efficient public services, part of which is a willingness to adopt the elected Mayor model. 
Taking England as a whole, the vast majority of its territory is covered by local authorities that, 
individually or through combined authorities, have submitted bids to the Treasury or are 
planning to do so.15  Clearly, Osborne has created a template that is transferable to other 
metropolitan areas and cities with clearly defined commuter belts. But the template cannot 
be applied in such a way as to cover the entire territory of England and will thus add to 
England’s fragmented governance arrangements. Beyond that lack of universal applicability, 
the Devo Manc model has shortcomings and many challenges lay ahead for GM’s leaders as 
they seek to build public consensus and implement the deal. 
 
 
Challenges ahead 
In GM, there are challenges ahead. Devo Manc has its critics locally, which GM’s political 
leaders are aware of. The major criticisms levelled at Devo Manc are that it lacks democratic 
legitimacy, transparency, and appropriate scrutiny, and that it is merely a cover for deep cuts 
to local authority budgets. It is hard to deny the first charge given that Devo Manc was 
manufactured by half a dozen elites in Whitehall and Manchester town hall. Even within the 
elite, this particular elite worked in secret, imposing decisions on key stakeholders. The only 
formal opportunities that GM citizens have had to submit their views was a short and poorly 
publicised consultation run by the Department for Communities and Local Government (23 
January to 13 February 2015), and a half-day public session by the House of Commons’ 
Communities and Local Government committee (on 26 October 2015). 
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The appointment of an interim Mayor – who will hold office until the May 2017 mayoral 
election and who will be influential in shaping the early implementation of Devo Manc – 
epitomised these failings. Tony Lloyd, a former Labour MP, and since 2012 GM’s Police and 
Crime Commissioner, was appointed, over Wigan council leader Lord Peter Smith, at a closed-
door meeting involving the ten local authority leaders. Questions to the candidates had to be 
submitted in advance and could only come from local councillors. At least the proceedings 
were video-captured and subsequently buried somewhere in the depths of the GMCA 
website. Local leaders pointed to the interim nature of the appointment as justification for 
the process.   
 
Yet, speaking to GM local politicians, it is remarkable that they actually embrace the secrecy 
with which they have proceeded to date. One GMCA leader stressed the technicalities of the 
deal and recognised that they were ‘moving this forward ahead of public opinion’ (Interview, 
GMCA Leader 3). Another recognised that, ‘the Combined Authority knows it hasn’t done 
particularly well with engaging the public in what we’re trying to do … The opportunity is there 
to engage more with the public. At the last Combined Authority meeting we agreed to move 
forward with a communications strategy’ (Interview, GMCA Leader 2). But a communications  
strategy is not public engagement. A third local leader suggested that ‘when we can start to 
say what it [Devo Manc] will mean, then it’ll be easier to engage the public … When people 
can feel it, then people will engage’ (Interview, GMCA Leader 1). Now that the deal has been 
agreed there does seem to be a willingness on the part of local leaders to engage but the 
mistrust it seems has already set in, as a result of the way the deal was brokered.  
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Based on the interviews I conducted with GM leaders, there were palpable fears that they 
might lose control of a public debate and thus not get the prize that they have been seeking 
for so many years. These fears seemed to be connected to an anti-politics attitude that might 
see local citizens rejecting the creation of new political offices and structures. Indeed, when 
Manchester (just one of the 10 authorities of the GMCA) held a referendum on whether to 
introduce a Mayor for the city in May 2012, voters rejected the proposal by 53.2% to 46.8%. 
So determined were GM’s leaders to secure the powers under the radar that the task of the 
interim Mayor has now become ‘to sell and promote’ the deal (Interview, GMCA Leader 4).  
 
Locally, the calls for a referendum are growing with the Greater Manchester Referendum 
Campaign for Democratic Devolution planning to target the council wards of the ten GMCA 
leaders at the May 2016 local elections. Spending time talking to activists and citizens in the 
GM area it is clear that the general level of knowledge of Devo Manc is poor, a failure of GM’s 
leaders.16 But there is evidence to suggest that people are willing to engage, and want to 
spend more time discussing these important issues. 
 
In a survey conducted in early 2015 with colleagues we found only a minority of around one 
in four people within each part of the UK said that too much time has been spent discussing 
how the UK should be governed (table 2).  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
There is also evidence that people do want decisions to be taken at a local level and that they 
trust their councils far more than they trust Whitehall.17 Taken together this ought to be a 
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recipe for localism and widespread public engagement. But that can only happen if local 
leaders are committed to participatory democracy. It will not occur by transferring powers  
from Whitehall to a shadowy, distant combined authority chaired by a interim Mayor for 
whom nobody voted. As interim Mayor Tony Lloyd has a chance, before May 2017, to think 
about how to build an inclusive, participatory democracy across GM. He sees the need ‘to get 
in and catch up. Connecting with the public has to be a part of this. Trickle down politics 
doesn’t work any better than trickle down economics’ (Interview, Tony Lloyd [Greater 
Manchester Police and Crime Commissioner]). He must resist the urge to approach the job as 
if he were a salesman when the appropriate analogy is that of an architect. He needs to work 
with academics in the emerging field of public engagement18 if he has any chance of navigating 
the complex network of GM stakeholders. 
 
The second critique of Devo Manc – that it is a way to help spread the blame for the cuts that 
are being administered to local government  – is more contentious. UK government figures 
confirm that the overall spending power of the ten local authorities constituting the GMCA 
has been reduced since 2010/11 (table 3).  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Local authorities across the city-region therefore have to do more with less, and will have to 
continue to make savings in the years ahead as Whitehall cuts continue. GMCA leaders are 
fully aware of this but their counter-argument is that, given the makeup of the current UK 
government, such cuts are inevitable. They are thus faced with a choice: live with those cuts 
under the status quo arrangements, or take on more powers in an attempt to find efficiencies, 
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economies, and design services that are both more tailored to local needs and that might 
produce economic growth to mitigate. They have opted for the latter. Those of a more 
conspiratorial bent will continue to suggest that Osborne’s motives are purely Machiavellian, 
designed to land the GMCA with a portion of the blame for the potential deterioration in 
public services. But the notion that GM’s leaders are naïve about this possibility is inaccurate. 
 
Conclusion 
Devo Manc is a milestone in the development of English governance. It is the culmination of 
years of cooperation and lobbying by GM’s leaders. It has become a reality thanks to a 
Chancellor – part motivated by economics, part by political calculations, and part by the quest 
for a legacy as he eyes the keys to 10 Downing Street – who was prepared to put his 
considerable political weight behind the project. Other local authorities are seeking similar 
powers, and some have already been successful in striking deals – somewhat smaller but 
certainly on the same direction of travel as Devo Manc – with Osborne. More will surely follow. 
For those in favour of greater local autonomy these deals, coupled with the Chancellor’s 
announcement on business rates, are welcome. It is the lack of transparency and 
accountability in these developments that remains the biggest cause for concern. If radical 
changes to the way that England is governed are implemented without any serious effort at 
public consultation, and without any concern for trying to revitalise and renew local 
democracy, it will be a missed opportunity. 
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Table 1. Agreement with different constitutional options for England, by region (% agreeing 
with propositions)  
  
EVEL 
 
Regional assemblies 
 
City-regions 
North East 70 55 58 
North West 72 53 59 
Yorkshire/Humber. 71 56 60 
West Midlands 71 50 57 
East Midlands 75 50 50 
East Anglia 72 52 49 
South West 72 50 52 
South East 72 50 53 
Greater London 66 50 57 
Sample size 3811 3703 3720 
Note: ‘Don’t know’ responses excluded; percentages weighted; sample size unweighted.  
Source: www.aog.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/171493/Briefing_-
_England_and_the_Process_of_Constitutional_Change.pdf.  
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Table 2. Evaluation of how much time has been spent discussing how the UK is governed, by 
country (%)  
 England Scotland N. Ireland Wales 
Too much 27 24 29 25 
Right amount 29 27 25 25 
Too little 44 48 46 50 
Sample size 3285 1410 487 940 
Note: ‘Don’t know’ responses excluded; percentages weighted; sample size unweighted.  
Source: www.aog.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/171108/Briefing_-
_Public_Preferences_and_the_Process_of_Constitutional_Change.pdf.  
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Table 3. Spending Power of the GMCA Constituent Local Authorities, 2010/11 and 2015/16 
 
Local authority 
2010/11 Spending 
Power, £ million 
2015/16 Spending 
Power, £ million 
 
% change 
Bolton 279.3 249.6 - 10.6 
Bury 168.8 154.1 - 8.6 
Manchester 623.2 511 - 18.0 
Oldham 253.9 215.9 - 15.0 
Rochdale 245.2 207.8 - 15.3 
Salford 280 248.9 - 11.1 
Stockport 255 243.2 - 4.6 
Tameside 222.5 197.5 - 11.2 
Trafford 185.6 172.4 - 7.1 
Wigan 297.7 274.1 - 7.9 
Source: Author calculations from Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG), Final local government finance settlement data. 
Note: DCLG states that Spending Power measures the overall revenue funding available for 
local authority services, including Council Tax, locally retained business rates, and 
government grants. 
 
1 Full  details of the research project can be found at 
http://www.aog.ed.ac.uk/news/last_3_months6/presentations_and_briefings_from_new_research .  
2 HM Treasury and GMCA, ‘Greater Manchester Agreement: devolution to the GMCA & transition to a directly 
elected mayor’, November 2014, at 
                                                 
  21 
                                                                                                                                                        
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/369858/Greater_Manchester_Agree
ment_i.pdf. 
3 P. Apps, ‘Manchester to benefit from 1.5bn of housing investment’, Inside Housing, 22 April  2015. 
4 ‘Earn back’ allows GM to be paid back up to £1.2 bil l ion of investment in infrastructure improvements, if 
those investments have demonstrably increased growth. ‘Earn back’ is closely related to the idea of tax 
increment financing that has been used in a l imited way in London and in some U.S. cities. See G. Bentley and L. 
Pugalis, ‘New Directions in Economic Development: Localist Policy Discourses and the Localism Act’, Local 
Economy, vol. 28, no. 3, 2013, pp. 257-74. 
5 R. Johnstone, ‘Manchester and Cambridge to keep 100% of business rate growth’, Public Finance, 18 March 
2015; R. Johnstone, ‘Osborne scraps core grant and allows councils to keep business rates’, Public Finance, 5 
October 2015. 
6 AGMA and NHS England, ‘Greater Manchester health and social care devolution: memorandum of 
understanding’, at www.agma.gov.uk/cms_media/files/mou.pdf (accessed 29 October 2015).  
7 C. Turpin and A. Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution: Text and Materials, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 248-9. 
8 M. Barlow, ‘Conurbation Complexity and Local Government Structure’, Political Geography, vol. 14, no. 4, 
1995, pp. 379-400; M. Emmerich and B. Frankal, ‘Building the Manchester of the Future’, Local Economy, vol. 
24, no. 1, 2009, pp. 93-7; A. Harding, M. Harloe and J. Rees, ‘Manchester’s Bust Regime?’, International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 34, no. 4, 2010, pp. 981-91. 
9 I. Deas, ‘The Search for Territorial Fixes in Subnational Governance: City-regions and the Disputed Emergence 
of Post-political Consensus in Manchester, England’, Urban Studies, vol. 51, no. 11, 2014, pp. 2285-2314. 
10 S. Quilley, ‘Manchester First: From Municipal Socialism to the Entrepreneurial City’ International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, vol. 24, no. 3, 2000, pp. 601-15. 
11 M. Heseltine, No Stone Unturned: In Pursuit of Growth, London, Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, 
2012; London Finance Commission, Raising the Capital, May 2013, at 
www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/fi les/Raising%20the%20capital.pdf (accessed 29 October 2015); City Growth 
Commission, Metro Growth: The UK’s Economic Opportunity, February 2014, at 
www.citygrowthcommission.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Metro-Growth-February-2014.pdf (accessed 
29 October 2015). 
  22 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 J. Harrison, ‘Life after Regions? The Evolution of City-regionalism in England’, Regional Studies, vol. 46, no. 9, 
2012, pp. 1243-59. 
13 G. Osborne, ‘We need a Northern Powerhouse’, Speech at the Manchester Museum of Science and Industry, 
23 June 2014, at www.local.gov.uk/documents/10180/11719/October+2014+Resident+Satisfaction+Polling+-
+Final+Report.pdf/dd57f664-443f-4bf7-9455-4506614bee6c (accessed 29 October 2015). 
14 C. Jeffery, ‘Where does the Labour party stand on English votes for English laws?’, The New Statesman, 15 
January 2015, at http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/01/where-does-labour-party-stand-english-
votes-english-laws.   
15 Local Government Association, Map of Devolution, 1 September 2015, at 
http://www.lgcplus.com/Journals/2015/09/01/x/k/a/Devolution-map-2015-web.pdf (accessed 29 October 
2015). 
16 T. Wilson, ‘Devo Manc: Overwhelming support for referendum as city clueless on devolution’, Mancunian 
Matters, 17 March 2015, at http://www.mancunianmatters.co.uk/content/170372930-devo-manc-
overwhelming-support-referendum-city-clueless-devolution.  
17 Local Government Association, Polling on Resident Satisfaction with Councils, October 2014, at 
www.local.gov.uk/documents/10180/11719/October+2014+Resident+Satisfaction+Polling+-
+Final+Report.pdf/dd57f664-443f-4bf7-9455-4506614bee6c (accessed 29 October 2015). 
18 O. Escobar, Transformative Practices: the Political Work of Public Engagement Practitioners, PhD thesis, 
University of Edinburgh, 2014. 
